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Abstract 
 
Failing to elicit requirements is as much of a risk in the traditional, negative sense as successfully 
defining requirements is a positive step towards successful systems development. The discipline of 
risk management has long since had to deal with the spectre of emergent risk and its inherent lack 
of predictability. Just as risk management considers how any number of vulnerabilities in a system 
may be exploited by accident or by malicious intent that preys upon exposure to otherwise 
independent factors, so successful requirements elicitation is beholden to the ability to recognise 
the need for, and define, derived requirements. In this paper we suggest that risk assessment and 
requirements elicitation are two manifestations of the same activity: creating trustworthy software1. 
We propose the research and development of a methodology where the two disciplines converge.  
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Introduction 
 
Requirements that are not fully explored during the early phases of development run the 
risk of an adverse impact on the development of systems (Fuxman et al., 2003) in much the 
same way that realised risk can have undesirable outcomes (Swann, 2000). Indeed there is 
much evidence to suggest the need for ascertaining good requirements early in 
development (Orr, 2004; Kauppinen, 2005) as a foundation for further development 
(Hofmann and Lehmer, 2001). Complexity reveals an ever growing catalogues of defects 
(like the Common Weakness Enumeration - CWE). Manifestations of these emerging defects 
cause us to ask if the formality and rigour we expect in the software engineering discipline is 
better described by the process of scientific discovery espoused by Koestler’s sleepwalkers 
(Koestler, 1959) creating a growing case study of emergent risk and derived requirements. 
 
However, in many approaches to development, functional and non-functional requirements 
are gathered hastily (e.g. McAllister, 2006), followed by the rapid development of design, 
system coding and implementation, e.g. Rapid Application Development (Martin, 1991). This 
almost certainly leads to the development of an information system which is not 
strategically viable and will not add value. A number of studies have shown that the cost of 
fixing requirements errors grows dramatically the later they are corrected (Soni, 2014; 
Axelrod, 2013) and this is in line with the study of quality defects in manufacturing (Crosby, 
1979). Further consequences of which can at best affect the success of the system – such as 
the Libra court-management system - which automated defective processes rather than re-
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engineering them - and at worst the entire organisation and even people’s lives – 28 people 
were killed as a result of a Patriot missile failure based on a poorly derived requirement for 
accuracy (Dresner, 2011). 
 
This paper focuses on the objective of successfully eliciting derived requirements during the 
design of systems at the same time as considering risks whose treatment will be effected 
and affected by the system as written. This contrasts with the expensive (and potentially 
catastrophic) emergence of requirement of a system in use where risks are realised with 
expensive consequences for recovery and rework. We contend that considering risk 
management as a separate discipline to requirements elicitation is inefficient and 
dangerous. It creates an air-gap between processes that have for too long been 
overshadowed by the enthusiasm to produce tangible code and the viament of satisfying 
new and emerging requirements as maintenance rather than admitting to the truth of 
earlier failures and a need to budget for new development. 
 
Derived requirements 
 
A derived requirement is defined by Young (2004) as one that is further refined from a 
higher-level requirement or a requirement that results from choosing a specific 
implementation or system element. This is compatible with the SWEBOK’s label of emergent 
properties (IEEE, 2014) which depend on the interoperation of components of the software. 
Leffingwell and Wigreg (2000) state that important requirement characteristics for derived 
requirements are traceability, consistency and abstraction. As derived requirements can 
change as a result of changes in the design, usually without reference to the customer, it is 
important to keep track of what is derived and what is not (Brooksby, 2003) in much the 
same way that the balance of risk must be tracked for its sensitivity to changes in probability 
and impact. Figure 1 shows the relationship between derived requirements and customer 
requirements. The loops between design and derived requirements indicate the many 
possible levels of design. A successful design derives non-functional requirements with the 
same priority as those elicited directly from the customer, baking in the trustworthiness 
(BSI, 2014). 
 
 
Figure 1: Requirement types (Brooksby, 2003) 
 
3 
 
Although derived requirements are not elicited directly from the customer/user they need 
to be treated just like other requirements in the system (Brooksby, 2003). Not satisfying 
them negatively impacts system performance, their absences constitutes risk, and 
consequently reduces customer satisfaction (Leffingwell and Wigreg, 2000). It does however 
tend to be more difficult to elicit derived requirements, and some of them may be 
overlooked in the process (Leffingwell and Wigreg, 2000) particularly when stakeholders 
have not been consulted (Checkland, 1981 and Carr, 2003). They should however be easier 
to change than user requirements and can be derived and deleted. But it is not always easy 
to know when the derivation of requirements should finish and when a derived requirement 
should have been part of the core requirements elicitation. 
 
Known and unknown requirements and risks 
 
Governance (BSI, 2014) sets out the involvement – or teamwork – that is needed to derive 
requirements and an understanding of risks to a system (Carr, Konda, et al., 2003). The 
categorisation of risk is based on CMU SEI’s taxonomy, which describes risks as having one 
of three characteristics: known risks that are well understood and will surface time after 
time in a risk assessment; unknown risks that did not make it into the risk register because 
the assessment did not call on the right kind of expertise; and unknowable risks that could 
not have been reasonably predicted even with a wide enough representation from the 
contemporary knowledge base. 
 
Figure 2 : Known and unknown requirements 
Derived requirements may manifest in any part of the quadrant (Figure 2) to show the 
direction requirements elicitation should take to derive as many requirements as honest 
governance drives. This quadrant was originally drawn up to consider risks which are ‘easily’ 
identified (known), those which are identified by specialist stakeholders (Alexander, 2007) 
involvement (known unknowns), those which would have been assessed had the 
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appropriate stakeholder been consulted (unknown knowns) and the ‘black swan’ risks which 
were outside contemporary knowledge (Taleb, 2008). For teamwork in particular 
consideration of a ‘worldview’ is needed to create the conditions for derived requirements 
to emerge early enough to remove or reduce the cost of rework and increase the risk of 
system success.  Checkland (1981) incorporates this aspect into the ‘Weltanschauung’ of the 
Soft Systems Methodology. Just as the management process of risk assessment (and then 
treatment) surrounds a system asset with the means of its protection, so the requirements 
elicitation process needs to consider treating the risks that would prevent a requirement 
being met, and the positive treatment of what needs to be done to develop the certainty 
that the requirement will be realised Figure 3. These are two manifestations of risk 
treatment which we suggest can be handled together. 
 
For example, the methodology to achieve for software trustworthiness (BSI, 2014) 
establishes a Trustworthy Software Constraint and Dependency Model before 
implementation to include external dependencies, such as customers and how they form an 
supply chain. The ‘Trustworthy Software Framework’ establishes a demand to understand 
the use cases for software and elicit derived requirements from them. This leads to risk 
management considerations - such as privacy and cryptography – being built into the design 
at an early stage. This is an efficiency shown in Crosby’s Quality Management Grid (Crosby, 
1979) which shows the cost of quality based on removing defects. The cost of removing 
defects reduces the earlier in the life cycle it’s done, and the maturity of the organisation 
required to achieve this increases. The consolidation of processes such as requirements 
elicitation and risk management is likely to be a metric of maturity. Security is a primary 
system/software quality characteristic (ISO, 2011) so security vulnerabilities and breaches 
are manifestations of quality defects and remedial controls are tantamount to derived 
requirements. 
 
Figure 3: Known process elements for risk-based requirements elicitation 
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The risks of placing transient content onto websites may result in advertisements (for 
example) appearing with other material with which the advertisers do not want to be 
associated. Assessing the software requirements derives the need to manage such risk, but 
this calls for the knowledge of the content owners that such a technology is available and 
could be used and for them to define what is acceptable to them and to the website 
designers and programmers to recognise where constraints can or cannot be made. It may 
be an instance where a risk is accepted or the facility rejected on account of the risk. An 
extrapolation of this example is the lack of control afforded to an advertiser placing adverts 
on a social networking site and the freedom of users to define content outside the close 
control of the website2. 
 
Moreover the choice of solution may reveal or create another, even more complex problem 
(Rittel and Webber, 1984) which may be expressed as a measure of risk. Derived 
requirements could therefore be termed as ‘wicked’ problems. ‘Wicked’ problems are 
typically characterised by uncertainty, conflict and uniqueness (Fischer et al., 1991). 
Conflicts may result from trade-offs with other requirements. And as the size of systems 
project increases so too does the complexity and the risk of errors. Therefore, derived 
requirements must be consistent with respect to the other requirements (Leffingwell and 
Wigreg, 2000). 
 
ISO/IEC 25010 (and its predecessor ISO.IEC 9126) has long since defined a requirements 
framework for systems and software quality based on characteristics which must be defined 
by a system’s requirements. PAS 754 (BSI, 2014) isolates five non-functional requirements as 
being the defining characteristics of trustworthy software these are: safety, reliability, 
availability, resilience and security (Watson, 2014). We suggest that a method can be 
defined that benchmarks requirements decisions for their impact on these five 
characteristics to enable emergent properties of a system to be teased out. Throughout 
development – and subsequently managed change – the understanding of system’s safety, 
reliability, availability, resilience and security must be whole. This would refine and integrate 
current practice to create a more sensitive method than expressing the impact of software 
risk in terms of probability and information asset value. 
 
Systems frequently fail to adequately protect the assets in their charge (Price Waterhouse 
Cooper, 2014). The UK Trustworthy Software Initiative (www.uk-tsi.org) reports that 90% of 
the incidents reported to GovCERTUK (Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) for UK 
Government) can be attributed to software bugs. The failure of the body of knowledge to 
encourage such protection (Dresner and Jones 2014), has led us to focus on the security 
vector in particular although as security comprises confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
(ISO, 2013), it is inseparable from common requirements that may be expected in every 
system depending on the risk decisions made during times of design or change. 
 
We have already seen that the requirements that take into consideration human factors can 
be measured against the security controls adopted by the system. Figure 4 draws on 
research by Dresner and Garfield (2014) and shows the areas of adequate and inadequate 
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requirements.  The better that the system has security controls built in – defined here as the 
manifestation of the system owner’s risk attitude – then the less reliant that the system’s 
assets are on its customers and actors for their security and by implication the other (non-
functional) quality requirements as expressed by quality characteristics of the system. 
 
 
Figure 4: Adequate and inadequate requirements 
 
Conclusion 
 
It could be said that requirements always tend to be incomplete. And the complex or 
otherwise termed ‘wicked’ (Rittel and Webber, 1984) nature of derived requirements makes 
their determination difficult as does the nature of emergent risk to the elicitation of building 
in risk treatments to a system. The process of risk assessment and treatment is part of 
requirements elicitation and vice versa. Considering measures for monitoring and elicitation 
of derived requirements could go some way toward lessening the impact that lack of 
elicitation may cause in the same way that mitigating actions, or controls, are derived to 
reduce the impact of negative risk and similarly – albeit culturally less often – increase the 
risk of success. The sooner that risk management and requirements elicitation are brought 
together into a single discipline, the sooner we may approach the nirvana of trustworthy 
software. 
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